Eco215

Understanding CBN’s Fiscal Liquidity Dominance and Why Monetary Policy is “Inflation Blind”

Oil production tracks higher on record output via Forcados: NUPRC data shows that Nigeria’s oil production increased slightly to 1.57mbpd (July: 1.53mbpd), driven by gains at Forcados (+16% to 291kbpd), Bonny (+6% to 177kbpd), and Erha (+10% to 65kbpd), which offset softer trends at Qua Iboe (-8% to 99kbpd), Escravos (-4% to 138kbpd), and Agbami (-6% to 87kbpd). The Forcados figure is the highest since NUPRC began providing monthly field data.

Figure 1: Nigeria – Oil Production by Field/Terminal

Source: NUPRC

Growth in monetary aggregates slowed over August:  The CBN released money supply data showing that while growth in the main monetary aggregates remained high, the pace of growth continued to slow. The annualized expansion across M3 and M2 slowed to 53% and 54%, respectively, down from the H1 run rate of +90%. This slowdown largely reflects a compression in credit growth. For instance, net domestic credit growth is at 15%, down from the 25% average over H1, driven by a contraction in credit to the government (-10% to NGN31 trillion). There has also been a slowdown in Credit to the Private Sector (CPS), which expanded by 29% on an annualized basis through August to NGN74.7 trillion, with the run rate down from H1 levels of +100%, reflecting tight credit conditions. From a structural perspective, growth in net domestic assets (NDA) is at 25% compared to net foreign assets, which have grown by +250%.

The small issue of delayed bond coupon payments: In the lead-up to September, sentiment across debt markets was generally bullish, buoyed by expectations of large coupon payments amounting to NGN835 billion for the month. However, an issue soon emerged as bond coupon payments, starting with the FGN 2036 bond, were delayed. While news outlets, led by Bloomberg, reported delays in payments on the minuscule FGN Savings Bonds—which the DMO attributed to technical issues—there was radio silence regarding the scheduled FGN bond coupon payments, which had been delayed for over a week. These delays likely contributed to tight liquidity conditions during the week and triggered a mild sell-off in bond yields ahead of the auction. The delayed payments appeared especially unusual, and it seems that Bloomberg’s report on the FGN Savings Bonds delays effectively forced the authorities to act.

So, what caused the delays? The DMO typically runs an efficient system and, over the last two months, had been net redeeming NTB maturities (July: NGN259 billion, August: NGN450 billion). This would ordinarily suggest that the agency was well-positioned to meet scheduled maturity payments or at least access on-budget financing through the CBN in case of any issues. However, here’s where my suspicion arises: the current fiscal authorities’ insistence on avoiding Ways and Means (W&M) financing, even within allowable limits, raises the possibility that occasional timing mismatches between receipts and outflows could lead to temporary cash flow issues. I believe these “technical issues” were the reason behind the delayed coupon payments.

Administratively, Nigeria’s fiscal function has been fragmented, with self-funding agencies handling tasks that would typically fall within the core ministry’s responsibilities. Separate entities now manage budgeting, debt, taxes, personnel payments, and the treasury single account operated via the CBN. This fragmentation likely presents cash flow coordination challenges in the absence of a strong treasury management operation. Fortunately, the issues were resolved, and the DMO eventually resumed coupon payments. In summary, a desire to avoid W&M financing, coupled with the pattern of net redemptions on the NTB front, likely created a gap in fiscal liquidity. With the current administration hesitant to tap into W&M financing, I suspect we might see more liquidity gaps when the fiscal side underestimates its cash flow needs, leading to delayed payments.

As for the bond auction itself, in a repeat of the August 2024 bond auction, the DMO—despite offering only NGN150 billion—happily tapped debt markets for NGN265 billion. The bid-cover ratio was healthy at 2.8x (August: 2.4x), which supported a further compression in average borrowing costs to 19.7% (previously 20.9%). However, the delayed bond coupon payments stifled any bullish excitement ahead of the auction, leading to sideways trading before the event.

Figure 2: Primary-Secondary Market Bond Yield Spread

Source: DMO

MPC delivers a surprise rate hike, tightens policy further:  At the September 2024 MPC meeting, where markets generally expected the CBN to pause its rate hiking cycle, the apex bank surprised with a 50bps increase in its key Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to 27.25%, alongside fresh increments to the CRR for commercial banks (+500bps to 50%) and merchant banks (+200bps to 16%). The CBN retained the asymmetric corridor around the MPR at -500bps/+100bps, meaning that the rate earned by banks on excess reserves is now 22.25%, while borrowing from the CBN will cost 28.25%. Despite declining inflation, the MPC took a rather hawkish stance, likely drawing confidence from the resilience in economic growth figures. The decisions were unanimous among the eleven (11) out of twelve (12) MPC members present.

After effectively reducing the rate paid on funds parked at its standing deposit window to 19% in August, the return to CRR hikes (which comes at zero cost) supports my view that while the CBN remains hawkish, it is becoming increasingly sensitive to the cost of its liquidity management operations. Furthermore, the Governor’s comments about the links between FAAC injections, financial system liquidity, and currency pressures suggest that the CBN now views this excess Naira liquidity as a source of instability across currency markets. Unsurprisingly, the MPR hike triggered selloffs in bond markets as we shall see. 

As I noted in my last post, Nigeria’s monetary policy framework requires fundamental adjustments, particularly in clarifying how the CBN influences its key intermediate interest rate variable to achieve its price stability objectives. While Nigerian monetary policy has often claimed to adopt an inflation-targeting framework, the absence of explicit inflation targets with appropriate time frames suggests otherwise. Indeed, a recent IMF Article IV paper characterized Nigeria’s monetary policy reaction function as “inflation blind” (Ree, 2020).

In my view, Nigeria’s central bank operates under a regime of fiscal liquidity dominance, which is the result of a combination of unsterilized fiat conversions of oil petro-dollar proceeds, federal fiscal expansionism, and an increasing share of sub-national off-take in FAAC allocations. Given the slowdown in oil receipts over the past decade and the soft underlying non-oil growth, these three secular forces have placed money supply on an expansionary path, growing faster than the rate of economic productivity.

Within the context of Nigeria’s import substitution industrial strategy—characterized by the production of final consumer goods with high imported raw material requirements—the outsized growth in money supply often undermines exchange rate stability. This creates a vicious cycle of inflation, erosion of purchasing power, and weaker non-oil economic growth. Without fiscal reforms aimed at balancing fiscal expansionism with the economy’s absorption capacity, the central bank, in its pursuit of price stability, must focus on containing money supply growth. This often requires a credible and less costly liquidity management approach (e.g., higher reserve requirements), along with a focus on ensuring real exchange rate stability. These are the main pillars for achieving price stability. Figuring out the right operational framework and instrument variables to achieve this goal is the key challenge of our time.

Inflows from delayed coupon bolster liquidity conditions, but CBN tightening drives yields higher: Financial system liquidity conditions eased last week after two weeks of tightness over the month following the receipt of the expected delayed bond coupons earlier in the week. This can be seen in the switch in the discount window net balances which swung from a net borrowing position to a net deposit position over the week average NGN328billion. In the prior week, Nigerian banks were net borrowers at the CBN discount window, averaging NGN566 billion daily (cumulative: NGN2.3 trillion) and around NGN509 billion in daily borrowings in the upper week. Nonetheless, CBN’s rate hike and another round of OMO auctions with the 1yr yield closing at 32% alongside CRR debits worked to induce bearish sentiments across bond markets. The sell-offs were profound at the front-end of the curve where yields climbed over 100bps while bond yields climbed between 60-80bps on average. 

Figure 3: Naira Yield Curve

Source: FMDQ

On the Eurobond front, last week the US Federal Reserve brough an end to the era of tight monetary policy with a 50bps cut in its target rates. In response Nigerian Eurobond yields are down 20bps on average across the curve from the end of August. 

Figure 4: Nigeria Eurobond Yield Curve 

Source: DMO

Nigeria posted a CA surplus in Q2 2024, reserves near USD40billion but Naira remains under pressure: CBN data shows Nigeria posted a current account surplus of USD5.1billion, up from USD3.4billion in Q1 2024. At the MPC, the CBN governor noted Nigeria’s external reserves neared USD40billion though the Naira remains under some pressure across FX markets which has triggered intervention sales across the BDC and interbank segments. 

References

  1. Jookyung Ree (2020). Nigeria—Strategy for a Monetary Policy Reset”, IMF, Nigeria Selected Issues, Country Report No. 2021/034
  2. Gary G. Moser (1994) The Main Determinants of Inflation in Nigeria. IMF Working Paper No. 1994/076. Published in Staff Papers, Vol. 42, No. 2, June 1995
  3. Thomas Baunsgaard (2003). Fiscal Policy in Nigeria: Any role for Rules. IMF Working Paper No 03/155

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