Eco215

Underinvestment Affecting Oil Production, GDP Growth Despite Headwinds, CBN Symbolic Rate Hikes

Nigeria Macro Weekly

Oil production is static at 1.5mbpd: Despite NNPC claims about hitting 1.8mbpd, data from the NURPC show that Nigeria’s oil production averaged 1.54mbpd slightly behind the 1.55mbpd in September driven by declines in Forcados (-32% to 164kbpd) and soft trends across Bonny (-1% to 202kbpd) and Agbami (-5% to 87kbpd) which muted the impact of recoveries at Qua Iboe (+40% to 133kbpd). Taking a longer view, the ongoing struggles with Nigeria’s oil production reflect underlying issues around underinvestment though theft appears to grab most of the headlines. A look across the big four export terminals one can see declines across Brass (down 70% from peak output to 34kbpd), Bonny (-23% to 202kbpd), Forcados (-39% to 164kbpd), and Qua Iboe (-42% to 133kbpd). Offshore fields which are insulated from theft/militancy issues and have supposedly ‘competitive’ fiscal terms are also seeing declines across board: Usan (-62% to 21kbpd), Egina (-64% to 73kbpd), Agbami (-45% to 87kbpd) and Bonga (-27% to 124kbpd). The underlying profile is one of IOC underinvestment which is being accelerated by a wave of exits from onshore/shallow water assets.  

Figure 1: Nigeria Oil Production Fiscal Regime

Source: NUPRC, Authors Calculation

Despite headwinds, Nigeria’s economy expands: Nigeria’s economy expanded by 3.46% in Q3 2024, driven mainly by the oil sector, which grew 5.17% vs. non-oil, which rose 3.37%. Improvements in the oil side reflect the depressed base of 2023 when the oil sector contracted over the first three quarters. Per the NUPRC data, production averaged 1.57mbpd. Non-oil growth was largely driven by the services sector expanding by 7% which helped offset softer trends across manufacturing (+1.2%), agriculture (+1.14%), trade (+0.6%) and Construction (+2.9%). The Q3 2024 numbers imply that Nigeria’s economic growth is on track to exceed 3% in 2024 (9M 2024: 3.2% vs 9M 2023: 2.45%). Services growth stemmed from Telecoms (+7%) despite a collapse in subscriber numbers following the completion of NIN verification, which saw the deletion of 64 million subscribers. My sense is the NBS report used the pre-verification data, and we are likely to see downward revisions on this line in the coming releases. 

Figure 2: Telecoms GDP growth and Subscriber Growth

Source: NBS, NCC

CBN Delivers Symbolic Rate Hike and Reverses on SDF: At its final Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting in 2024, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) implemented a modest 25 basis points (bps) increase in its Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), bringing it to 27.5%. This concluded a hawkish year where the apex bank delivered cumulative rate hikes totaling 875 bps. Other policy parameters remained unchanged, with the interest rate corridor around the MPR set at +500/-100 bps for the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) and Standing Deposit Facility (SDF), respectively.

Nigeria’s monetary policy framework employs a corridor approach. The MPR serves as the anchor rate, flanked by two key rates:

  1. Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) – The rate at which the CBN remunerates banks for depositing excess reserves.
  2. Standing Lending Facility (SLF) – The rate at which banks borrow from the CBN.

In theory, short-term market rates, such as 90-day to 1-year Treasury bill yields, should remain within this corridor, reflecting where the CBN believes interest rates should be to uphold its price stability mandate. Despite its claims of being an orthodox central bank, the CBN raised eyebrows in August with the issuance of a circular that capped the amount banks could deposit in the SDF window to earn interest. Under the circular, deposits exceeding NGN3 billion would be remunerated at 19%, significantly below the prevailing SDF rate of 25.75%. This policy echoed a similar directive under former Governor Godwin Emefiele, marking a return to unorthodox monetary practices. In my view, this undermined CBN’s credibility, particularly as it coincided with a sharp increase in yields on Open Market Operations (OMO) bills to over 30%.

Effectively, the CBN opted not to remunerate excess reserves at the SDF rate of 25.75%, only to pay 30% on the same reserves through OMO bills. From a monetary economics perspective, this decision blurred the lines between discount window operations (which allow banks to take the initiative) and open market operations (where the central bank takes the lead). After months of market confusion, CBN finally reversed this misguided circular last week, restoring some semblance of consistency to its monetary policy framework

Figure 3: Monetary Policy and Market Rates

Source: FMDQ

The Week Ahead

Into December 2024, having secured parliamentary approval for foreign borrowing in November, it is likely that Nigeria looks to tap global Eurobond markets within the first two weeks of the month. 

All eyes on the CBN’s new FX market system: December marks the launch of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Electronic Foreign Exchange Matching System (EFEMS), a new platform for interbank trading of USD/NGN by Authorized Dealers. In preparation, the CBN has issued several guidelines and codes. Under the new FX Code, the CBN declared: “Nigeria pursues a floating exchange rate regime, and the value of the Nigerian naira (NGN) is determined by the market forces according to the demand and supply of foreign exchange.” This move aligns with the orthodox policy direction of the Cardoso-led CBN, with the adoption of a fully transparent electronic trading platform allowing market forces to determine naira pricing. Many view this as the ultimate goal for FX management. However, while this shift is commendable, it is important to note that the system’s success will be judged primarily by the stability it achieves—or fails to achieve—amid a context of sharp naira depreciation over the past two years and persistently high inflation. For the CBN, stability in the FX market hinges on securing significant and sustainable USD supply. Without addressing the structural imbalances driving demand for foreign exchange, even the best trading platforms may fail to achieve meaningful results.

On the EFEMS itself, the CBN circulars stipulate that the EFEMS platform will be operated by Bloomberg, the global financial markets infrastructure firm founded in the 1980s by Mike Bloomberg. While Bloomberg is a reputable operator, embedding the name of a private, non-Nigerian entity into regulatory guidelines for such a critical market raises significant concerns. Rather than stipulating the service provider outright, the guidelines could have specified conditions for selecting platform operators through a transparent, competitive process. By naming Bloomberg directly, the CBN has effectively legislated a monopoly, tying market participants to a single vendor. This arrangement obliges authorized dealers to purchase computer terminals from Bloomberg, payable in USD, under long-term contracts with limited flexibility. Such a structure could stifle competition, innovation, and the opportunity to diversify critical financial infrastructure in Nigeria. While the new system aims to enhance transparency and efficiency, the approach to implementation may carry unintended consequences for market dynamics.

I will close with the phrase by Adam Smith, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantage.”


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