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Naira Weakens as Oil Prices Teeter, Inflation Dips

Nigeria Macro Weekly – #2025.09: Oil prices on a knife edge, Naira assets decline, inflation likely moved lower in February on lower energy costs.  

The long-awaited OPEC+ unwinding is around the corner, oil markets in near contango: After averaging USD 79/bbl in the first two months of the year, oil prices opened weaker in March, with the widely watched Brent benchmark sliding to $70/bbl last week. Crude oil markets appear to be actively pricing in the recent announcement by OPEC+ that it would proceed with its planned unwinding of 2.2 million b/d of “voluntary” output cuts in April. Some OPEC+ members are already producing above their quotas (Kazakhstan: +28 kbpd, Nigeria: +8 kbpd), and the expectation is that the group will unwind gradually over Q2 2025.

That said, several confounding factors remain. Firstly, in light of the recent rapprochement by the U.S. President, markets also appear to be pricing in relaxed U.S. sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil exports, which could boost global supply. On the demand side, Chinese crude imports have softened over the last two months, while the global macroeconomic outlook appears weaker amid ongoing tariff wars. Overall, the backdrop points to a weaker fundamental picture for oil prices, as reflected in a reduction in long positions in crude contracts and a pick-up in short positions across the WTI and Brent benchmarks. That said, from a time spread perspective, oil markets are moving into near contango, suggesting that some of the pressure reflects near-term slack issues around refinery maintenance, which should ease over Q2 2025. Fasten your seat belts, volatility lies ahead, and crude markets look set to move into the $60-70/bbl range over March 2025.

Figure 1: Crude Oil: Prices and Demand-Supply Balances

Source: EIA

Eurobonds sell off, Naira ends run of weekly gains: No sooner had oil prices slipped below USD70/bbl than sentiment around the Naira began to sour. First, the Nigerian Eurobond complex saw a sell-off, with yields rising by 30–50bps over the week (implying a 1–3% drop in prices). This bearish move likely reflects a knee-jerk reaction to the decline in oil prices. As a result, year-to-date gains on Nigerian Eurobonds have now been trimmed to 1.6%.

The weakness in oil prices also appears to be spilling over into the exchange rate, with the Naira closing Friday at NGN1,556/USD—its lowest level since late January. Offshore investors seem to be cashing in on their carry trade gains following the Naira’s 5–6% appreciation and the rally in Treasury Bill yields (16–20%) over the past two months. If oil prices continue to decline, this could serve as a catalyst for the unwinding of the FX carry trade—barring any significant deterioration in global financial market sentiment. 

This raises questions about Nigeria’s readiness to manage the exit phase of the carry trade, which has largely driven the Naira’s strength over the past three months. External reserves currently stand at approximately USD 38.4 billion, and while oil production is trending higher, uncertainties remain regarding its impact on reserves. Additionally, the significant legacy liabilities from crude-for-refined-petrol swap arrangements continue to cloud the outlook. The Naira is likely to yo-yo in the coming weeks few weeks with a real possibility of a retest of the NGN1600/bbl.  

Figure 2: Nigeria: Eurobond Curve

Source: DMO

DMO blinks at NTB auction, larger budget driving a reverse? At the fortnightly NTB auction, the DMO aimed to sell NGN650 billion against NTB maturities of NGN1.3 trillion, aligning with its Q1 2025 net redemption strategy. As in previous auctions, demand remained strong, with bids totaling three times the offer, though lower in absolute terms (NGN1.9 trillion vs. NGN2.4 trillion in the last auction). Unsurprisingly, stop rates declined in line with trends in the secondary market, with the widely watched 1-year paper closing at 17.82% (effective yield: 21.8%). Notably, the DMO opted to sell NGN830 billion—NGN180 billion above its initial target—marking a shift from past practices. With the budget now passed, the realities of the government’s borrowing requirements may be prompting a reassessment of the original plan.

Following the NTB sale, CBN announced an OMO auction restricted to banks and foreign investors. Against an offer of NGN600 billion, demand remained robust, with bids reaching NGN1.9 trillion. The CBN ultimately allotted NGN1.7 trillion at stop rates of 19.2–19.45% for the two papers (355-day and 362-day), translating to effective yields of 23–24%. This persistent divergence—where two distinct markets exist for essentially the same security, with significantly different pricing—contradicts the principles of orthodox monetary policy. It is a lingering legacy of the Godwin Emefiele era. As I will argue later, the time has come to eliminate the multiple interest rate tier regime.

Bond ‘disinversion’ rally has hit the pause button: Bond yields were mixed over the week, despite an influx of liquidity from coupon payments and the continued decline in NTB yields. The front end saw yields decline by 50bps, while the more liquid belly of the curve rose by 25–35bps. The long end closed flat to slightly higher, though with limited supply, these movements are less indicative of broader trends. Despite the CBN maintaining a neutral stance at the February 2025 MPC meeting, FGN bond yields have rallied following the lower CPI reading post-rebasing and the DMO’s efforts to guide markets lower. These efforts began with net redemptions in its Q1 NTB calendar and were reinforced by the surprise removal of the 10-year bond from the February offer circular.

In the near term, the outlook points to lower inflation, a dovish monetary policy stance, and increased liquidity from maturities. However, the recent softness in oil prices—against the backdrop of still sizable FGN debt issuance—poses potential headwinds. In thinking about the future, I am reminded of a quote – Bull markets are born on pessimism, grow on skepticism, mature on optimism, and die on euphoria. The quote is by Sir John Templeton, the Templeton in Franklin Templeton.

Figure 3: Naira Curve

Source: DMO

Inflation likely declined in February under the new CPI series: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is set to release the February CPI report, and early indicators suggest a monthly decline is likely. While much attention has been given to the announced reductions in petrol prices (8–10% to NGN825–860/litre), diesel prices have seen a far more significant drop—from NGN1,500–1,600/litre in December to around NGN1,000/litre. This sharp decline reflects the growing impact of output from the Dangote Refinery, which is reshaping domestic energy price trends. Beyond supply dynamics, the moderation in diesel prices also stems from the recent appreciation of the Naira in the parallel market, which heavily influences diesel pricing, as well as softer global crude oil prices. These price declines appear to be filtering through to other segments, most notably food. Posted prices on the AFEX Commodity Exchange show maize prices down 7% month-on-month (YTD: -20%), while media reports highlight 20–30% reductions across rice and other cereal crops.

Given these trends, a retracement from the January CPI print seems likely, with a negative monthly inflation reading in the range of -0.1% to -0.5%. This would place the headline inflation figure at approximately 22–23%.

My Big Idea – its time to remove the bifurcation between OMO and NTB markets. 

In 2019, the CBN introduced a policy restricting access to Open Market Operation (OMO) bills to only banks and foreign investors, effectively locking out non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as pension funds, asset managers, and insurance companies. This move created a two-tier debt market, where OMO bills consistently offer higher yields than Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs), despite both securities being functionally identical.

At the time, the policy essentially reflected to reduce the cost of liquidity management but has led to unintended distortions in market pricing, hindered monetary policy transmission, and created an uneven playing field. If the current CBN leadership is committed to restoring orthodoxy in monetary policy, then dismantling this artificial segmentation should be a priority.

Liquidity Management Should Be Holistic: Liquidity conditions in Nigeria’s financial system affect banks, foreign investors, and NBFIs alike. The segmentation of the OMO market artificially restricts liquidity flows, making it harder for NBFIs—major players in Nigeria’s financial system—to participate in liquidity absorption or redistribution. This restriction limits the effectiveness of liquidity management policies, forcing the CBN to rely on distortive interventions rather than allowing market forces to play their natural role.

Market Efficiency and Price Distortions: A key principle of well-functioning financial markets is that identical securities should not trade at vastly different yields. The OMO-NTB split has led to an inefficient pricing dynamic where OMO bills, which are accessible only to banks and offshore investors, trade at significantly higher yields than NTBs. Banks and foreign investors, who can participate in both markets, enjoy an arbitrage opportunity at the expense of NBFIs. This not only distorts price discovery but also creates an uneven playing field in the domestic fixed-income market.

There is a historical precedent for central banks creating specific securities to attract offshore investors. In 1994, Mexico introduced Tesobonos, a government security designed to appeal to foreign investors by being denominated in pesos but indexed to the U.S. dollar. This structure aimed to reassure offshore investors worried about currency risk, making Tesobonos an attractive carry trade instrument. This setup sounds familiar, though unlike Tesobonos, OMO bills do not have explicit currency indexation. However, the underlying risk dynamics bear a resemblance. During the Tequila Crisis (1994-1995), investor confidence in Mexico deteriorated due to political instability and fiscal concerns, triggering a rapid capital flight. The peso came under intense pressure, and as it depreciated, the government faced an unsustainable burden of Tesobono redemptions, which were effectively dollar-denominated liabilities. This collapse led to a full-blown currency and financial crisis, ultimately requiring a U.S.-led bailout to stabilize Mexico’s economy.

Currently, outstanding OMO bills amount to NGN16.2 trillion (USD10.8 billion), yet there is limited visibility on the breakdown between domestic banks and offshore investors. In the event that offshore investors need to sell—a development likely to occur under a disorderly exit scenario—the continuing market bifurcation works against a potential pressure release valve in the form of non-bank FIs, as domestic banks would be unable to absorb the shortfall.

In my view, the bifurcation of Nigeria’s debt market has outlived its usefulness. It distorts market pricing, undermines efficient liquidity management, disadvantages domestic institutional investors, and weakens monetary policy transmission. Under an orthodox monetary policy setting, there is no grounding for artificial restrictions on OMO securities. 


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