Nigeria Macro Weekly
OMO dislocations trigger front-end turmoil on the naira curve: Last week, yields across the Naira curve pushed higher, led by sharp sell-offs on the front-end (+60–80bps), while the belly saw more moderate increases (+20–30bps) and the long end remained relatively flat. In my view, the turbulence on the short end is closely tied to growing dislocations in the OMO bill segment.
Some context: Nigeria operates two short-term government securities — conventional NTBs (Nigerian Treasury Bills) issued for fiscal liquidity purposes, and OMO bills, issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to manage banking system liquidity. Until 2019, these instruments were largely indistinguishable in market terms. That changed when the CBN controversially restricted access to OMO bills, barring non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and reserving participation for banks and foreign investors. The CBN then began issuing OMO instruments at materially higher yields than NTBs — despite both securities being functionally similar. This marked the beginning of a prolonged shift into unorthodox monetary policy under former Governor Godwin Emefiele. Though recent leadership at the CBN has attempted a return to orthodoxy, this particular dual-track pricing mechanism has persisted. OMO bills continue to be issued at 28–32%, compared to NTBs, which peaked at 28–29%.
But creating a market with just two classes of participants has its risks — as many foreign investors discovered last week. Liquidity in the OMO segment proved to be a mirage during stress. Many investors who had watched OMO bills rally to 21–22% during Q1 2025 suddenly saw those gains wiped out following the Liberation Day tariff announcement, with some bills trading as high as 28-32% in the sell-off. Coupled with renewed naira depreciation, the episode offered portfolio investors a real-time case study in the fat tail risks that often accompany carry trades in frontier markets.
Figure 1: Naira Yield Curve
Source: Bloomberg
Energy Pressures Drive Inflation Higher in March: Nigeria’s inflation trajectory reversed in March, rising to 24.2% y/y (Feb: 23.2%), largely on the back of sharp price pressures within the energy basket. On a month-on-month basis, headline inflation accelerated to 3.9%, with energy costs rising by an estimated +9% m/m, outpacing more modest increases in food inflation (+2.2% m/m). While the NBS has yet to publish detailed energy price data for the month, anecdotal evidence points to significant variation in petrol prices across the country. Following the deregulation of petrol pricing, pump prices in many locations—particularly outside major urban centres—remain well above the indicative levels published by the NNPC. The utilities component of the CPI basket posted a sharp +12% m/m rise, reinforcing the role of energy in the inflation uptick. Under the revised goods and services classification by the NBS, goods inflation led the way (+4.0% m/m) relative to services inflation (+3.4% m/m). Spatially, price pressures were more pronounced in urban areas (+3.96% m/m, +26.1% y/y) than in rural areas (+3.73% m/m, +20.9% y/y). The March print introduces new uncertainty into the disinflation narrative and may lower the odds of a rate cut at the May 2025 MPC meeting, barring a material downside surprise in April inflation data.
Figure 2: Nigeria Inflation: Headline, Core and Food
Source: NBS
Oil price sell-off sparks rout in Nigerian Eurobonds: After falling 3% in March, the Nigerian Eurobond complex sank further in April, down 7% MTD. For context, the EMBI index has lost around 2% over the period. The negative price trend mirrored heightened concerns following the drop in oil prices with an expansion in spreads over US treasuries which widened to over 650bps on the 10-year. Though the situation stabilized briefly after oil prices recovered, the sell-offs suggest the unwinding of a crowded Nigeria trade over the last six months.
Figure 3: Nigeria Sovereign Eurobond Curve
Source: DMO
Nigeria’s oil production declined in March: Nigeria’s crude oil production, including condensates, declined for a second consecutive month in March, down 4.1% to 1.6mbpd. The drop was driven by sharp declines at key export terminals: Forcados (-21% to 219kbpd) and Qua Iboe (-25% to 115kbpd), along with slowdowns at Bonga (-4% to 126kbpd), Agbami (-2% to 81kbpd), and Usan (-26% to 29kbpd). Interestingly, despite a mid-March explosion on the Trans Niger Pipeline, which feeds the Bonny terminal, output via Bonny rose 9% to 247kbpd. Excluding condensates, Nigeria’s crude output stands at 1.4mbpd, still below its OPEC+ quota of 1.5mbpd.
Figure 4: Nigeria Oil Production by Regime
Source: NUPRC
Oil prices had a rollercoaster week with prices at some point down 8% to USD60/bbl. over the week as markets reacted violently to the OPEC+ surprise announcement of planned output increases of 441kbpd in May on top of the 133kbpd increment in April. On top of the heightened concerns over demand in the light of the American instigated trade wars, the bears swung prices lower. Following the news of the 90-day pause, prices pared back losses to 1.6% to close at USD64.5/bbl.
Nigeria debt surges in 2024 mostly driven by currency translation effect: The Debt Management Office (DMO) released 2024 figures showing that Nigeria’s total public debt (FG + States) rose by 49% to NGN144.7trillion, driven by increases in both domestic (+26% to NGN74.3trillion) and external debt (+84% to NGN70.3trillion or USD46.3 billion). The sharp rise in external debt is largely a result of currency depreciation, as the actual increase in dollar-denominated borrowings was modest at +9%, reflecting mainly the USD2.2 billion Eurobond issued in December 2024. On the domestic front, the growth was led by FGN borrowings (+32% to NGN70.4trillion), while state government debt declined (-32% to NGN3.9 trillion). The increase in federal debt likely includes the second tranche of Ways and Means (W&M) advances (estimated at NGN7trillion), after accounting for gross bond issuances (NGN5.8 trillion), new NTBs (NGN5.8 trillion), and a domestic USD bond (NGN1.4 trillion or USD917million). Interestingly, the additional NGN30 trillion W&M debt, booked at a 9% interest rate, has helped lower the estimated average cost of domestic debt to 9.5% (from 13.9% in 2023). External debt service costs remain relatively low at 8.1% (2023: 8.3%), though this may rise once the 2024 Eurobond issuance begins accruing interest.
In terms of key debt metrics, debt-to-GDP has increased to 47% (2023: 37%), largely due to naira depreciation. However, the debt service-to-revenue ratio has improved to 62% (2023: 68.5%), supported by stronger FGN retained revenues, which are tracking NGN18.5 trillion on an annualized basis (based on NGN12 trillion as of August 2024).
Table 1: Nigeria Debt Indicators
Source: DMO, NBS, Budget Office, Authors Calculation
Globalization and its discontents
A return to the age of mercantilism: President Donald Trump unleashed a torrent of turmoil across global financial markets following his liberation day declaration of tariffs across major global economies. At the baseline, all countries received a minimum 10% baseline tariff while large economies were given varying tariff rates, well above their effective weighted average tariff rate and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate under WTO rules. The tariffs were framed as ‘reciprocal’ with tariff rates ranging from 10 to 50% and were complemented with sector specific tariffs such as imported cars and steel (25%). However, the were some exemptions on crude oil, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and rare earth metals. The nature of the tariffs is contentious as they were computed using a ratio of the US trade deficit to US imports from a given country, divided by two, or 10 percent, whichever rate is higher. So even if the United States has no trade deficit (or a trade surplus) with a country, they still receive a minimum tariff of 10 percent. As an example, if the US imports $200 million worth of goods while exporting $100 million to a country, then the Trump Administration alleges that country levies a 50 percent tariff on the United States (the difference between $200 million and $100 million, divided by $100 million). The “reciprocal” tariff put into effect by President Trump on Wednesday would be half of that, 25 percent. In response to the announcement, global financial markets sold off strongly before the announcement of a 90-day pause (ex-China) calmed nerves.
The announcement marks a stark repudiation of much of conventional economic thinking dating back to Adam Smith.
Since the end of World War II, success in international trade has been closely linked to national economic growth. While trade is inherently a zero-sum game at the geopolitical level, classical economic theory — rooted in Smithian and Ricardian principles — argues that countries benefit by specializing in areas of comparative advantage and trading to acquire what they lack. This efficient allocation of resources underpins modern global economic integration.
As Adam Smith famously wrote:
“It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy… What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.”
He also recognized the broader social value of open markets:
“As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. [Trade restrictions,] by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible.”
However, Smith was no idealist. He acknowledged that the political economy — dominated by entrenched interests, monopolies, and lobbyists — would likely resist the full restoration of free trade:
“To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it.”
In today’s world, global trade remains zero-sum in perception if not in structure. When the losers of globalization form a significant political constituency, democracies without strong consensus-building institutions or robust social safety nets risk growing polarization. This creates fertile ground for populists and demagogues promising radical solutions. The big risk of the return of nationalism and deglobalisation to my mind is that it will pose hard uncomfortable questions about liberal democracy and we are about to go test Francis Fukuyama’s last man thesis.
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