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Nigeria’s Q2 Outlook – What is The Way for Nigeria?

Nigeria – Fixed Income: Q1 2025 Review and Q2 2025 Outlook

Lower inflationary expectations and active DMO management underpins yield descent: In Q1 2025, rates along the Naira yield curve broadly declined by 220bps, with the most significant compression occurring at the front end (420**bps), while the belly (-200bps) and long end (-60bps) experienced more moderate declines. The sharp drop in short-term yields was primarily driven by market reaction to net NTB redemptions by the Debt Management Office (DMO). This shift marked a departure from the long-standing trend of net issuance or rollovers that had characterized NTB auctions since the COVID-19-driven liquidity surge in 2020. By opting for net repayments, the DMO signalled a more active stance in managing liquidity conditions, reinforcing market expectations of a more accommodative interest rate environment. However, as we shall see, the DMO ultimately deviated from its planned issuance calendar—alongside unexpected departures in its offer circular—raising serious concerns about the credibility of its forward guidance. These inconsistencies undermine market confidence and create unnecessary volatility in pricing expectations.

Figure 1: Naira Yield Curve

Source: Bloomberg

In any case, debt markets swiftly moved into bullish territory over February after the release of rebased CPI data, which showed a 12pps decline in headline inflation. This rally was further reinforced by the DMO’s unexpected withdrawal of the 10-year bond from its February auction, signaling a strategic shift away from high-coupon debt issuance in anticipation of lower rates. However, the market’s optimism was tempered in March by the DMO’s surprise decision to increase planned NTB issuance from NGN4.3 trillion to NGN5.12 trillion, triggering a shift to a bearish stance. In terms of actual issuance, the DMO sold NGN5.5 trillion in NT-bills against maturities of NGN5.2 trillion well clear of its initial and revised guidance. 

On the bond front, while gross bond sales totalled NGN1.94 trillion (+128% q/q, -23% y/y) against maturities of NGN562 billion. Overall, the sharp decline in inflation underpinned a rally in interest rates, with NTBs delivering 1.8–3.5% returns over the quarter, while bonds outperformed with a 6.3% return.

Table 1: Fixed Income Performance

Source: S&P Global, FMDQ, DMO

Despite deeply positive policy rate differentials (+300–400bps) relative to inflation, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) opted to maintain its benchmark rate at a record 27.5% during the February 2025 MPC meeting. However, in response to strong offshore demand, the CBN lowered stop rates at its OMO auctions—still restricted to foreign investors—to 19.5% (effective yield: 24%), down from 23.9% (effective yield: 31.4%) in December 2024. OMO bill sales totalled NGN4.57trillion, exceeding maturities of NGN1.6 trillion but marking a slowdown from NGN5.9 trillion in Q4 2024. In effect, the CBN maintained a net liquidity tightening stance, aligning with its stated policy direction. That said, the decision to allow auction rates to decline suggests a degree of flexibility, likely aimed at managing the cost of sterilization while balancing liquidity control.

A topsy turvy quarter for Nigerian Eurobonds: Nigerian Eurobonds had a volatile quarter, starting the year strong on the back of improving risk sentiment and a significant compression in spreads over U.S. Treasuries (USTs). However, sentiment soured in March following a drop in oil prices below $70/bbl and an attack on the Trans-Niger Pipeline, a key trunkline feeding into the Bonny export terminal. The subsequent declaration of a state of emergency only heightened investor concerns over Nigeria’s oil revenues, triggering a wave of risk-off sentiment. As investors pressed the panic button, a sell-off ensued, leading to widening spreads across Nigeria’s Eurobond complex which gave up all its gains in March, closing the period relatively flat though with some variation: the front end closed lower (-50bps on average) while the mid-to- long end moved higher (+5-10bps on average). 

Figure 2: Nigerian Eurobond Curve

Source: DMO

Q2 2025 Outlook: A Window for Policy Adjustments and Market Rebalancing

While Q1 2025 was dominated by concerns over tariff wars (or the threat thereof) under President Donald Trump, Nigeria remains a small trading partner with the U.S. and is on the good side as we run a trade deficit to the US. Likewise, U.S. development aid constitutes a negligible share of Nigeria’s federal budget, limiting the direct impact of the cuts to donor assistance. 

For Nigeria’s debt markets, the key variables remain oil receipts and capital flows. After a subdued first quarter—during which Brent declined 1.4% and briefly dipped below $70/bbl—oil prices now appear poised for a mini-rally in Q2 2025. This is despite OPEC+ proceeding with a long-anticipated output increase, starting with a 135kbpd increment in May. Renewed buying interest from fund managers suggests that the impact of fresh U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil is outweighing the supply increase. As a result, sentiment around oil should remain supportive of Nigerian risk assets, creating a favorable window for a Eurobond issuance. Meanwhile, oil output should hold steady, barring further political disruptions in Rivers State. Capital flows remain anchored on CBN credibility, which has largely sustained market confidence. With signs of a thaw in the U.S. exceptionalism narrative, Nigeria may continue to attract carry trade inflows.

Monetary policy: A shift towards easing: On the policy front, the March-April inflation print will be a critical determinant of monetary direction. Inflation is expected to moderate to 21-22%, which would place the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at a 500-550bps premium over inflation. This creates room for the CBN to cautiously ease rates, with a likely 200-300bps cut at the May 2025 MPC meeting, bringing the MPR to 24.5-25.5%.

Additionally, the CBN may adjust the asymmetric corridor around the MPR from -100bps/+500bps to -100bps/+300bps. However, a reduction in the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) from 50% remains unlikely, as it remains a low-cost tool for liquidity management compared to OMO issuance. Unleashing that level of liquidity could have direct implications for the naira, making any CRR adjustments more probable later in the year.

Overall, my sense is that the CBN is likely to adopt a symbolic rate cut strategy, while delaying more aggressive liquidity easing until later in the year. Nonetheless, the reduction in policy rates—alongside adjustments to the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) and Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)—should result in lower system funding costs, leading to a moderation in NTB and placement rates, which could trend toward 22-23%.

Figure 3: Policy Rates vs Average NTB & Bond Yields

Source: CBN

In terms of demand and supply trends across, the system maturities remain large across board: NTBs (NGN2.9trillion), OMOs (NGN3.1trillion) and FGN bond coupons (NGN938billion). On the issuance side, FGN bond sales in Q1 have trailed 2024 levels, despite a larger budget deficit in 2025. Q2 2025 will likely serve as a catch-up period, with the DMO expected to maintain its usual 5-year, 7-year, and possibly 10-year bond offerings. For Eurobonds, with $1.5 billion in maturities due in November, attention will shift toward potential new issuance in Q2 2025, likely in the $2-3 billion range. Given the relatively strong reform momentum, this could be Nigeria’s best opportunity to push through a Eurobond sale at favourable terms.

Figure 4: Maturity Profile 

Source: CBN, DMO, Authors computation

Bull-Flattening to continue? The downward adjustment in policy rates is expected to drive further reductions in short-term yields, with the 1-year NTB yield likely settling around 20-21%. This should, in theory, trigger a second-round decline in FGN bond yields, with on-the-run bonds potentially retesting the 18% level. However, as I noted earlier, the DMO is likely to ramp up issuance to catch up on its funding needs, which could temper bullish sentiment in bonds. Also, a successfully large Eurobond sale could give the DMO more room to ‘’dunk’’ on domestic markets by scaling back on domestic borrowing until Q3, reinforcing the downward trend in yields. 

Overall, Q2 2025 presents a critical window for Nigeria to recalibrate policy amid a supportive oil market backdrop and improving capital flows. While the CBN is likely to opt for measured easing, the DMO faces a pivotal test in catching up on domestic bond issuance while weighing a strategic Eurobond sale. If executed smoothly, these dynamics could set the stage for lower yields and a bull flattening over Q2. 

My big idea for the week: Credibility in Debt Issuance Matters

As I have previously argued, the DMO should not be in the business of actively managing the yield curve—this falls outside its remit. Its primary responsibility is to execute a transparent and predictable issuance strategy that aligns with fiscal funding needs, not to influence market interest rates, which is the domain of monetary policy. Granted, the DMO includes a standard disclaimer reserving the right to adjust issuance in response to market conditions. However, in the game-theoretic framework that governs debt market auctions, repeatedly wrong-footing market participants is highly damaging and erodes credibility.

In major global markets, deviations from stated treasury issuance plans are rare without prior guidance. Sovereign debt managers in developed markets—such as the U.S. Treasury, the UK Debt Management Office (DMO), and Eurozone issuers—follow structured, transparent issuance processes to maintain market confidence. When changes occur, they are well-telegraphed through formal guidance or market consultations.

  • U.S. Treasury: In its Quarterly Refunding Announcement (QRA), the U.S. Treasury provides a detailed outlook on expected issuance sizes, maturities, and any anticipated adjustments. If changes are required due to fiscal developments, they are signaled well in advance through consultations with primary dealers and market participants. Abrupt, unexplained shifts in issuance strategy are rare, as they could disrupt market stability.
  • UK Debt Management Office: The UK DMO publishes an Annual Remit outlining planned issuance sizes and instrument types. Adjustments—such as changes in gilt issuance volumes or tenors—are typically preceded by market consultations and official statements. Sudden, unannounced deviations are highly unusual.

Unlike global issuers that prioritize credibility and transparency, the DMO frequently deviates from issuance plans without adequate guidance, which creates uncertainty in the fixed-income market. This unpredictability weakens investor confidence, distorts price discovery, and increases borrowing costs over time. To align with best practices, Nigeria must adopt a more structured communication framework by:

  1. Providing credible forward guidance on planned issuances and expected adjustments.
  2. Engaging in regular market-wide consultations (not with a narrow select grouping) before making significant changes.
  3. Ensuring issuance strategies remain predictable and transparent, reducing uncertainty in debt markets.

While flexibility is necessary in dynamic markets, frequent, poorly communicated deviations undermine credibility. If there is a need to adjust issuance plans due to changing conditions, the proposed shifts should be communicated transparently—just as global issuers do—to preserve market integrity and foster a stable yield curve.


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