A return to yield curve inversion, Naira on the ropes
The Week that was (Feb 5-9, 2024)
- DMO switches the NTB issuance script, sells NGN1 trillion at record levels: The prior week opened with the Debt Management Office (DMO) issuing an NTB offer circular proposing a total issuance of NGN1 trillion, significantly exceeding the programmed maturities by over NGN600 billion. This large offering spooked bond markets, leading to an immediate sell-off with the 30-year bond yield spiking to 18%. Despite the initial turbulence, the DMO successfully sold the entire target amount, setting a record high stop-rate of 19% (effective yield: 23%) for the 1-year tenor. The confidence displayed in offering NGN1 trillion suggests the DMO had assurances of strong offshore demand, possibly from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). In the lead-up to the auction, reports indicated increased portfolio inflows with large turnover volumes in the FX market. Thus, the hefty NTB offer suggests that the FGN is now taking up the burden of providing securities for the dual purpose of Naira liquidity sterilization and attracting capital flows. This is timely as the CBN appears to be unable to credibly sterilize Naira liquidity on its balance sheet. Alongside the release of a NGN2.5 trillion planned bond offering, the episode lends credence to the view that the FGN is looking to avoid fiscal deficit monetization via Ways & Means.
- Heavy fiscal front-end issuance drives yield curve inversion: In the secondary market, interest rates along the Naira curve climbed 200bps on average driven by a surge on the front-end (+700bps) following the NTB auction while bonds moved up 50bps. Unlike prior episodes of yield curve inversion which were the result of liquidity tightening by the CBN, this episode reflects aggressive issuance by the DMO on the front-end of the curve. The shift in preference towards short-dated paper is consistent with a desire to minimize debt service costs, which had seen the removal of the long-dated bonds from the offer circular with the on-the-run restricted to a 15-year. The readthrough could be that Nigerian policymakers have come to a common understanding that risk-free yields need to be elevated to attract capital flows to stabilize the currency. However, lacking the balance sheet headroom to do this, the CBN is now turning to the DMO to carry the can so to speak. This suggests heavy issuance of short-term paper is likely over the near term until a potential decline in inflation drives a re-assessment in H2 2024.
Figure 1: Naira Yield Curve

Source: Bloomberg
- Naira plunges into a deadly spiral at the FX market: After a tumultuous close to January, when the Naira fell 38% over the month to NGN1485/$, the turmoil deepened further with a 10% depreciation to NGN1605/$ at the official window, though the parallel rate closed over NGN1700/$. Though there has been a pick-up in USD liquidity within the NAFEM window, now averaging $500 million versus just over USD100 million in 2023, the Naira continues to plummet at an alarming speed. Coincidentally, the renewed downtrend follows a raft of circulars from the CBN which 1) removed spread restrictions on FX trading and on remittance flows, 2) forced banks to unwind net-long USD positions on their balance sheet, 3) Ended the Emefiele-era practice of paying remittance receipts in USD. The circulars suggest that the CBN is committed in its quest for a flexible exchange rate system for Naira determination. However, these changes represent marginal plumbing adjustments to try to force USD liquidity to equilibrate within the official market. Indeed, the release of a subsequent circular which capped the amount of USD flows that international oil companies can repatriate to their offshore parent at 50% sends a mixed signal. Specifically, it suggests that while the CBN is keen on price flexibility, this is not indicative of moves towards capital account liberalization and could be seen as a sort of capital control. This could be problematic at a time Nigeria is trying to get these IOCs to commit to new investment projects that will require dollar inflows.
- In my view, the current crisis is really more about confidence hinged on the uncertainty over fundamentals given the lack of clarity over external reserve levels and oil petrodollar export flows. The point is the lack of interventions are testament to claims that a large chunk of the CBN’s FX reserves is effectively encumbered. Fundamentally, despite oil prices remaining supportive over the last one year and relatively modest oil production levels (1-6-1.7mbpd), oil flows are yet to recover to levels necessary to bolster USD liquidity, which raises doubts over the scale of the liabilities incurred under the much-maligned crude-oil to refined petrol swap arrangements deployed by the Buhari government to finance the large petrol price subsidies. This is why external reserves have moved lower from the USD33.3 billion level in late January to USD33.1 billion in February, which suggests that dollar supply will remain challenged. In economic literature, currencies can overshoot their equilibrium levels as economic agents double down speculative positions on a currency in the aftermath of large, unexpected adjustments to preserve the value of their assets in a bid to front-run coming inflation. This scenario is problematic in economies with poorly developed financial markets where people have limited access to high yielding domestic assets and deep stock markets.
- Inflation moves through the gears in January 2024 on higher farm produce inflation: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released the first inflation report of 2024, revealing a surge of 100 basis points to 29.9%. This increase was primarily driven by elevated food inflation, which reached 35.4%, while core inflation stood at 23.4%. The monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) showed a notable rise to 2.6% (compared to 2.3% in December), with food inflation contributing significantly at 3.2%, and core inflation at 2.2%. At the core of the spike in food prices lies domestically produced farm produce, which is experiencing inflation at 36.7%, in contrast to imported food items at 26.3%. While it’s tempting to attribute the trends in domestically produced food to insecurity, two factors seem to be influencing the situation. Firstly, Naira depreciation has provided an incentive for increased cross-border food flows to neighbouring Francophone countries which make use of the CFA franc which is pegged to the Euro. Essentially, Nigeria has handed a 40-50% discount on food prices and this has driven increased exports of various food items which is forcing an upward adjustment for domestic food prices. Thus, while food is available, farmers have greater incentive to shift it across the border to earn more for bang for their crops though at the trade-off of higher domestic prices. The second dynamic involves domestic diesel prices, which being deregulated, have risen 38% over the last three months in lock-step with the Naira depreciation.
Figure 2: Monthly Food inflation and its components.
Source: NBS
- The recent acceleration in Naira depreciation implies a bleaker outlook for inflation compared to the beginning of 2024. With headline inflation now exceeding 2% per month, the annualized print is likely to approach the 35-40% range in the coming months before gradually easing to around 30% by the end of the year. Unless policymakers intervene to stabilize the exchange rate, the resulting pass-through effects via diesel and export prices raise the prospects for much elevated domestic food prices. This projection assumes no additional adjustments to petrol prices from current levels.
- CBN Normalization of CRR: Old Wine in New Bottles? Among several circulars, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced changes to its cash reserve ratio (CRR) framework. Notably, the CBN stated it would end the practice of applying the current CRR (32.5% for commercial banks, 10% for merchant banks) to adjusted end-of-day deposit balances. Instead, it would apply the CRR to only incremental deposits above the weekly average adjusted deposits, citing this as a way to help banks plan better. Additionally, the CBN reiterated its application of a 50% CRR levy on shortfalls to its target minimum loan-deposit ratio of 65%, aiming to encourage banks to lend to the real economy.
- In my view, these justifications resemble misleading justifications frequently employed by Nigerian policymakers as part of unhelpful approaches to mask the underlying trade-offs in their policy toolkit. As I’ve argued in past articles, unlike in other countries where the central bank acts as the marginal supplier of liquidity, Nigeria’s regular conversion of petrodollars into naira constitutes the main source of excess liquidity within the banking system. To effectively sterilize these excess cashflows, the CBN would need to issue large amounts of open market operation (OMO) bills, potentially incurring operational losses. While no explicit rule forbids the CBN from posting losses, there’s an implicit constraint: Nigerian politicians are more likely to subject the CBN to intense scrutiny and issue public criticism upon the occurrence of large losses. These risks have become more pronounced in recent years with the CBN’s interventions in the banking sector via AMCON bonds and its monetization of the fiscal deficit through Ways & Means, which accounted for more than the CBN’s own balance sheet assets at the end of 2022. This means, in the absence of significant devaluations, the CBN, already burdened by large swap liability positions, risks incurring substantial losses. Therefore, at the heart of the CRR tweaks lies the desire to control the costs of managing excess liquidity, given the implicit constraint that prevents the CBN from posting losses.
- Consequently, Nigeria’s central bank has long deployed the CRR as its preferred tool for curtailing excess Naira liquidity due to its zero-cost nature. Governor Sanusi’s tenure at the CBN, perhaps correctly identifying this constraint and recognizing public sector deposits as the main driver of excess liquidity, introduced a tiered CRR system with a high rate of 75% on public sector deposits and a lower rate on private deposits. Governor Emefiele’s tenure, however, in a manner lacking due consideration, chose to unify the private and public CRR, naively believing that the mere implementation of improved cash management through the Treasury Single Account would solve the problem of dollar-to-naira conversions. This ultimately resulted in a crude “anything goes” CRR method. Today, Governor Cardoso’s CBN, which initially pursued the same ad-hoc CRR debits of its predecessor on a much larger scale and higher frequency, now presents itself as refining the system. Rather than simply acknowledging its true aim of curbing liquidity management costs, the CBN is throwing a red herring by suggesting a desire to boost lending to the real economy. This message contradicts CBN’s open communication of an intention to tighten liquidity. It’s akin to presenting a mixed message, saying one thing while doing another. You are refining a tool meant for tightening while publicly expressing a desire to expand credit growth when you’re openly saying you want to rein in Naira liquidity.
- DMO proposes record bond sale, rates are moving higher: In a departure from the usual norm, the DMO continues to operate debt markets without a quarterly calendar. This would allow fund managers and institutional investors to plan their investment cycles and is a key characteristic of well-functioning debt markets. More chaotically, the DMO sought to offer NGN2.5 trillion evenly split across planned new issuances (7yr – 2031 and 10yr – 2034) with the 10-year offer puzzling in view of the large maturities in the year. To a market used to issuances within the NGN400–600 billion range, the big number was a surprise and induced a sell-off in debt markets. In my view, the increased randomness within the DMO likely reflects intrusions by the less organized Finance Ministry into the operations of debt markets. Unexpectedly, the large offer failed to gain traction and the DMO suffered the humiliation of having to extend the auction for an extra day. Furthermore, there is whisper of desperate calls to cajole banks to deploy excess CRR liquidity, which had been sequestered by the CBN, that eventually helped the sale clear 60% of the target at 18.5%-19% for 7-year and 10year paper. The switch to excess CRR liquidity previously out of circulation runs counter to the desire to tighten liquidity as this fresh cash to fund an expansionary fiscal program. In essence, Nigeria’s economic policymakers are coordinating to run policy at cross purposes to each other. A puzzling paradox if I ever saw one! The shift to adhoc large bond sales suggests a desire to match the financing cashflow profile of the FGN and avoid Ways and Means financing from the CBN. This is likely to mean higher issuance over the near term, given the timing differences between fiscal collections and budgeted expenditures. Given the size of these financing requirements relative to financial market liquidity, the development suggests a greater impetus for interest rates to move higher on the prospect of higher debt issuance.
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